The Militarization of the South (Article 66)
The names are still familiar to many of us today; Confederate President Jefferson Davis, General Joseph Johnston, Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, John Magruder, P.G.T Beauregard, Braxton Bragg, Jubal Early, James Longstreet, George Pickett, Benjamin Helm (Abraham Lincoln’s brother-in-law), John Bell Hood, George Washington Custis Lee (Robert E. Lee’s son), J.E.B. Stuart, and Andrew Jackson III (grandson of President Andrew Jackson). All were from Southern states, all received their education at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and all served the Confederacy in the Civil War.
Most historians agree that the significant underlying causes for which thirteen Southern states chose to secede from the Union, and form the Confederate States of America, were economics, the sovereignty of individual states, and of course, the retention of slavery. Some historians and social scientists, make the additional argument that the South was more willing to first threaten, and then be ready to fight, a Civil War because so many of its political, social, and business leaders had received their educations at various military academies and/or had military experience. The term “Militarization of the South” was used by some as a pejorative; but is it a fair and accurate term? Then, if so, did it influence the beginning of the war and, equally important, did it affect the outcome?
Since the time of the Revolutionary War, almost all Southern states had regulated militias in which male citizens could be trained and be ready for service if called upon by their state government. Then, in late 1860 and early 1861, as various states began to secede from the Union,
the ranks of those state militias began to swell with men who had received their military training at private and state military colleges and with graduates of the U.S. Military Academy and the U.S. Naval Academy. Of the nearly 1,100 graduates of the U.S. Academies from the classes of 1830-1860, over 300 served the Confederacy, including many who were still on active duty and resigned their commissions to join the Southern military forces. And, they were joined by even more officers from the U.S. Army and Navy who were not Academy graduates.
The new Confederate government was still organizing its military forces, so most of these volunteers initially joined the militia in their home state; and, they were prepared to defend their state from potential invasion by Union forces. However, within a few months after the start of the war, most of these state units were integrated into the Confederate armed forces.
The concept of loyalty to the state of one’s birth would seem odd to recent generations, as mobility has nearly made allegiance to a particular state obsolete; but, in the 18th and 19th centuries, it was normal. And, the political leaders, who led secessionist movements, counted on that parochial loyalty to raise armies to defend against any attempt by the Federal government to force the return of the state to the Union through military action. In fact, historians estimate that 65-75 percent of eligible men in the thirteen seceded states joined either the Confederate armed forces (Army or Navy) or their state’s militia during the war. By contrast, in the North, that percentage was likely 35-40 percent. Clearly, most of the enlisted level Confederate soldiers and many of the officers were not fighting to preserve slavery or against oppressive excise taxes; they fought because Union forces were marching into their home states.
Regardless of the motives of those who chose to fight, by mid-1861, the South had built an effective fighting force, with a solid group of educated and experienced officers to lead the troops; however, to a certain extent, southern society was already “militarized” long before the threat of Civil War.
In some ways way, southern aristocratic families resembled the feudal families of Europe who identified more with their feudal land than with a governing nation; and who protected their large land holdings by passing the inheritance to the eldest son (if there was one), rather than break up the land among several siblings. In the American South, families identified with their home state, where the family’s holdings often dated back to colonial times, before the United States was even founded. Theirs was a patriarchal society and, in general, the eldest son was expected to continue family traditions and control the family’s assets; which were often centered around plantations (and the slaves to provide the labor) or large merchant and financial enterprises. Younger sons, however, were expected to use their wealth and position in some noble service. Of course, there were a few gadflies who chose to simply enjoy the benefits of being part of the wealthy leisure class; but, most of these privileged young men sought a useful career. Aristocratic Southern families encouraged contributions to the betterment of their state and their social structure, and many of their sons became politicians (a noble career at that time), judges, lawyers, educators, merchants and even clergymen. But one of the most coveted and admired occupations was that of an Army or Naval officer.
Soon after the Revolutionary War, the new United States of America (both north and south) realized a viable military would be necessary to maintain that hard fought independence; and a source of well trained and disciplined officers would be needed. In 1801, President Thomas Jefferson (of Virginia) approved the formation of the United States Military Academy to be located at West Point, New York and the first class of cadets entered in 1802. Forty years later, Congress authorized the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, specifically as a training program for future officers in the Navy; and its first class graduated in 1854.
Since many Southern families valued a military education as a noble and desirable profession for young men, an appointment to either Academy was highly prized. However, there was such a demand for a formal and elite military education, which would lead to a commission in the U.S. Army or in a state’s “well regulated” militia, that several small colleges were formed throughout the Southern states with a component of military training and discipline. But, even the addition of those private schools could not meet all of the requests for a military education and several states, which already maintained militia forces, established and funded their own military schools. The very formation of the Citadel in South Carolina in 1839, the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) in 1842, and the Louisiana Military Academy (later to become LSU), were directly a result of the increasing demand in the South for a premier military education. While not all of the graduates of these in-state academies immediately joined their local militia, they were available upon notice if their state should ever issue a call to arms. Many fought in the war with Mexico in 1846-47, in which Southern soldiers actually comprised a larger portion of the U.S. force than the much greater populated northern states.
And, they would again respond as the South prepared for war in 1860.
Those who contend that “Militarization of the South” was a factor in the Civil War believe that the large number of Southern men with a military education and/or military experience, may have given the political leaders a sense of confidence (or over-confidence) that they could quickly defeat the northern states. Confederate President Jefferson Davis, who had graduated from West Point, fought with the U.S. Army in the Mexican War, and later was the U.S. Secretary of War, said just prior to the attack on Fort Sumter, “We will start, and finish, the war!” and, speaking of Union President Abraham Lincoln he said, “There is no fire in his fight.” In the end, both of his statements were proven wrong!
So, in answer to the earlier questions; is “Militarization of the South” a fair term; and if so, did it influence the start of the Civil War or affect the outcome?
The appreciation by Southern families of a military education and/or career was not so much a glorification of warfare, as simply one accepted way for young men to meet their implied duty to serve their society. And, their courage and sense of honor was extraordinary; as one General said (paraphrased) after a Confederate defeat, “If valor alone could have carried the day, we would have been the victors.” Therefore, the use of the term “Militarization of the South” as a pejorative is not appropriate; however, aside from that, the term is probably fair. It certainly gave secessionist leaders a level of confidence that, with their strong contingent of experienced officers to lead dedicated troops, they would quickly defeat the disorganized Union. And, even when victory did not come early, the militarized South was able to prolong the war in the hope (misplaced) that the Union, and Abraham Lincoln, would tire of the war and just accept the independence of the Confederate States.
On the other hand, that early advantage soon faded before the overwhelming mass of men and materiel available to the Union forces; and so, the “Militarization of the South” may have delayed, but it did not affect, the final outcome of the Civil War.
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