The Hampton Roads Peace Conference (Articles 74, 75,and 76)

PART 1: A Fiasco at Niagara

 “The recent Niagara Falls Peace tryst, was a gathering of un-elected men, who were sanctioned by neither Lincoln or Jefferson Davis; and who only accomplished further inflamement of passions, North and South. We have Horace Greeley and the Tribune to blame for this scandal.” – editorial by a competitor of Greeley’s at another newspaper.

 In July 1864, Horace Greeley, publisher of the New York Tribune, decided to become a negotiator for peace. When he learned that several Southern representatives had gathered in Niagara Falls, Canada, and were prepared to discuss peace terms, Greeley encouraged President Abraham Lincoln to participate. Although he received a response from Lincoln, it was not as enthusiastic as Greeley hoped; but he pressed on without any real authority. The meetings were held among several men including a minor political influence peddler, three Confederate operatives with no credentials, and Greeley, whose ego was only surpassed by his outrage and vindictiveness when he perceived a slight. With that cast of characters, the conference was a failure; however, the incident gave Abraham Lincoln the opportunity to clearly express his conditions for peace, and in that respect, the meeting served some purpose.

 Those gathered in the Canadian town of Niagara Falls, plus others in New York City and in Washington DC, over a two-week period included, in addition to Greeley, William “Colorado” Jewett, who was known to Lincoln and Greeley, and who had been on the periphery of several schemes, usually unsuccessful, to influence politicians. Jewett had been the person who notified Greeley that “Southern Peace Commissioners” were in Canada. Those “commissioners” were Clement Clay, of Alabama, and Jacob Thompson, of Mississippi, both former U.S. Senators before the Civil War, and Professor James Holcomb of the University of Virginia. Also, in attendance was George Sanders whose role has never been clearly defined, but was a liaison to some Northerners who sought Canadian help in opposing the American Civil War. And, eventually, Lincoln sent John Hay, one of his secretaries with a message for Greeley.

 By mid-1864, many in the North had become very tired of the war. In June, Abraham Lincoln had been re-nominated for a second term, but the delegates were not enthusiastic about his re-election chances. The people wanted peace, and peace at almost any price. Thompson, Clay, and Holcomb, staying in Canada, let the word out that they were authorized by the Confederacy to confer about possible peace terms. As they hoped, Jewett, whose political machinations were well known, contacted Horace Greeley, publisher/editor of the New York Tribune, who immediately contacted President Abraham Lincoln.

 On July 7, 1864, Greeley wrote to Lincoln and encouraged his participation in discussions. In his long letter Greeley wrote, “Our bleeding, bankrupt, almost dying country also longs for peace-shudders at the prospect for new conscriptions (Lincoln was contemplating a new draft), of further wholesale devastations, and of new rivers of human blood. And, a wide-spread conviction that the Government (meaning Lincoln) is not anxious for peace, and do not improve proffered opportunities to achieve it, is doing great harm now, and, is morally certain, unless removed, to do far greater in the coming elections.” Greeley was giving a veiled threat to Lincoln that if word got out that he refused any opportunity for peace, he would lose the 1864 Presidential election. And, Greeley would have been ready to be the one who would spread that word through his newspaper and other contacts.

 Greeley added an admonition for Lincoln, “Mr. President, I fear you do not realize how intently the people desire any peace consistent with the national integrity and honor. I do not say that a just peace is now attainable, though I believe it to be so. But I do say, that a frank offer by you to the insurgents of terms…will…prove an immense and sorely needed advantage to the national cause; it may save us from a northern insurrection. I beg you to invite those now at Niagara to exhibit their credentials and submit their ultimatum.” (The words “do” and “offer” were underlined in Greeley’s letter and not by this author)

 Lincoln did not believe that Jefferson Davis had authorized any delegation. However, not wanting to give the New York editor ammunition to accuse him being unwilling to hear a possible prospect for peace, Lincoln wrote Greeley and suggested that he go to Niagara Falls and determine if their credentials were, in fact, legitimate authority on behalf of Jefferson Davis. Then, if they possessed such written credentials, Greeley should tell them that Lincoln would grant them safe-passage to Washington.

 Lincoln’s apparent trust in Greeley might seem strange since Greely had done everything possible to prevent Lincoln’s re-nomination. But Greeley’s vanity was such that he assumed Lincoln would (or at least should) value his advice. Privately, Lincoln referred to Greeley as, “an old shoe — good for nothing now, whatever he has been.”

 Greeley desperately wanted some conference to occur and just as desperately, now wanted to be part of it. He wrote Lincoln on July 13: “I have now information on which I can rely that two persons duly commissioned and empowered to negotiate for peace are at Niagara Falls, in Canada. Their names, only given in confidence, are the Hon. Clement C. Clay, of Alabama, and Hon. Jacob Thompson, of Mississippi. If you should prefer to meet them in person, they require safe-conducts for themselves, and for George N. Sanders, who will accompany them. In negotiating directly with yourself, you would be enabled at all times to act upon the freshest advices of the military situation. All that is assumed is a mutual desire to terminate this wholesale slaughter, and it seems to me high time that an effort to this end should be made. I am quite sure that a frank, earnest, anxious effort to terminate the war on honorable terms would immensely strengthen the Government in case of its failure, and would help us in the eyes of the civilized world, which now accuses us of obstinacy, and indisposition even to seek a peaceful solution of our sanguinary, devastating conflict.” (This is an edited version; Greeley never used a few words, when he had a chance to use many.)

 Lincoln sent another message to Greeley encouraging him to verify the credentials of the emissaries and offering safe-passage if Greeley believed they were valid and urged him on by stating, “I was not expecting you to send me a (another) letter but to bring me a man or men.”

 President Lincoln could not afford to alienate Greeley or to appear to reject a genuine peace overture. But, Lincoln smelled a rat! And, he thought it was time to bring the matter to a close. He was ready to teach the meddlesome Greeley a few lessons on the art of politics (and of over-confidence). And, Lincoln realized that he could use Greeley’s actions to show the country that any such negotiations were either unauthorized by Jefferson Davis or doomed to failure because of irreconcilable differences.

 John Hay, Lincoln’s secretary, was dispatched to New York bearing a personal, confidential note for Greeley from Lincoln which clearly stated his position.  But this time the letter was addressed “To Whom It May Concern” and Lincoln wrote, “Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States will be received and considered by the Executive government of the United States, and will be met by liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points; and the bearer, or bearers thereof shall have safe conduct both ways.” Lincoln was sure the letter would be leaked to the press; in fact, he counted on it!

 Greeley now had his authorization from Lincoln, but even he must have recognized that the President left no “wiggle room” for the future existence of the Confederacy or continuation of slavery by including language about the “…integrity of the whole Union and abandonment of slavery” in the letter. But, Greeley plowed on; and, after some disagreement over the exact terms of safe-passage” for the Confederates who feared arrest when they crossed the border, Greeley headed for Niagara Falls.  Upon arrival he notified the Confederates of Lincoln’s safe-conduct pass and willingness to meet, if Greeley could be satisfied that they were truly authorized by Jefferson Davis to speak on behalf of the Confederacy.

 Greeley told the Confederates, “I am informed that you are duly accredited from Richmond as the bearers of propositions looking to the establishment of peace; that you desire to visit Washington in the fulfilment of your mission. If my information be thus far substantially correct, I am authorized by the President of the United States to tender you his safe-conduct on journey proposed, and to accompany you at the earliest time that will be agreeable to you.”

 Then things began to fall apart.

 The Southern “delegates” hesitated; and then admitted that they had no credentials from Jefferson Davis but were earnest in trying to broker a peace deal. They declared that no negotiations were possible based on Lincoln’s continuing insistence that the Confederacy dissolve and the seceded states rejoin the United States. Further, they said that they intended to inform Davis and his administration that their sincere efforts had been rebuffed. Greeley realized that he had been used. The Southerners would make it appear to not only their constituents, but to Northerners and the world at large, that it was Lincoln and the Union which were roadblocks to peace, not the Confederacy.

 Greeley thought he could shrewdly bring the two side together before any firm negotiating positions were stated; but in fact, he had been out-maneuvered by Lincoln and the Southerners. 

 The entire episode was an embarrassment for Greeley, who did not take any slight very well. To further his discomfort, the Southern delegates released Lincoln’s letters to the press and declared that Lincoln’s demand that slavery be abolished was the primary cause for failure of the peace initiative. Democratic newspapers in the North and almost all newspapers in the South, accused Lincoln of continuing the war for the sole purpose of ending slavery; knowing that a majority in the North supported the war only to re-unite the Union (but not to end slavery). Even many of Lincoln’s political friends believed that his “To whom it may concern” letter would cost him re-election because it was a declaration that the war was now to be fought to abolish slavery; a notion not accepted by many in the North.

 While Lincoln had gambled that he would not lose too many constituents with his position; he also knew that the Democratic Presidential Candidate, expected to be former General George McClellan, would press the point in his bid to wrest the presidency from Lincoln in November 1864. Lincoln’s best hope was that events over the next few months, including prospective Union victories, would show Northerners that the Union was winning, that the Confederacy would lose, and, with the victories, Lincoln believed voters would accept emancipation along with re-union. But, the fact was that Lincoln himself was never certain he could win another term.

 However, for now, Lincoln had to do some damage control and issued a statement that, “If there was anybody or any delegation at Niagara Falls, or anywhere else, authorized to represent the Southern Confederacy and to treat for peace, they had free conduct and safety to Washington and return.” Lincoln later said, “Instead of Mr. Greeley doing it that way, he went there as an ambassador, and with an array of reporters established himself on the American side and opened negotiations with these two alleged envoys across the bridge. I had reason to believe that these envoys were without authority, because President Davis had said to this friend of mine and of his that he would treat (meaning to negotiate) on no terms whatever but on absolute recognition of the independence of the Southern Confederacy.” The friend to whom Lincoln was referring was James Gilmore, who had met with Jefferson Davis and was told by Davis that, “The war must go on until the last man of this generation falls in his tracks, unless you acknowledge our right to self -governance.”

 Not any wiggle room there either!

 Lincoln later said, “Of course, they never came, because their mission was a subterfuge. But they made Greeley believe in them, and the result is that he is still attacking me for needlessly prolonging the war for purposes of my own.” Greeley did finally support Lincoln for re-election, but only after the Union had established the likely-hood of victory when Atlanta fell in September 1864. Greeley liked to back winners and Lincoln won that election.

 It has been said that, “No attempt at peace in time of war is wasted.” While the Niagara meetings did not plant a seed for real peace, the episode did provide Abraham Lincoln with the opportunity to, again, declare his position that he would never accept the continuation of the Confederate States, but, instead, only full restoration of the Union.

And, the Civil War would continue until that outcome was finally reached.

 But, There was another, more rational, attempt for a Peace Conference; At Hampton Roads, Virginia.

 (The story of the Hampton Roads Peace Conference, where Abraham Lincoln met with three Confederate emissaries is told in these next two sections. First, “The Prelude” then followed by “The Meeting”)

The Prelude:

In the Presidential election of November 1864, Lincoln dominated in almost all Union states and he carried an overwhelming majority among the military, both officer and enlisted alike. Most voters in the north wanted to force capitulation by the south and expected an end to the Confederate government. Some, but certainly not all, saw the demise of the Confederacy as the means to the end of slavery. Lincoln’s opponent, in the 1864 election was former General George McClellan, who had offered, as a condition of a peace agreement, recognition of the Confederate States of America as a separate entity; further, he did not call for the immediate end of slavery. He lost big!

The electoral mandate Lincoln received had established his authority and now he was focused on ending the war, which he believed would come by keeping military pressure on the South. However, to some, the time seemed ripe for a peace initiative, and the idea which eventually led to the Hampton Roads Conference was born; although it was not an easy path.

The simple historical account is that President Lincoln, accompanied by Secretary of State Seward, met on February 3rd, 1865 at Hampton Roads, Virginia, with three commissioners representing the Confederate States, to discuss possible peace terms. However, at the conference, Lincoln would not accept the continued existence of the Confederate Government and Jefferson Davis had only authorized the Commissioners to discuss a two-state solution. So, the war would go on for another few months, and more Union and Confederate soldiers would die, (and Lincoln would be assassinated), before hostilities ceased. Even then, the Civil War ended, not with peace commissioners signing a treaty, but only when Confederate Generals, who realized their cause was lost, began to surrender their forces.

As a result, some Civil War historians have called the Hampton Roads Conference a failure, a wasted opportunity, or a relatively unimportant event. Some of this is just academic arrogance, with individuals putting their own spin on historical events.

In many ways, Lincoln was a complicated man, but, these narratives miss his very simple, and uncomplicated, reasons for attending the Peace Conference at Hampton Roads. He wanted to press upon the Southern leadership that he would accept only a re-unified nation with no “two government” solution to the war; and, to deliver a clear message that the institution of slavery was doomed. Lincoln’s intended to leave no room for equivocation or mis-understanding.

With that in mind, the Hampton Roads Conference served a valuable purpose as Lincoln and Confederate President Davis as both knew their goals were absolutely incompatible. Davis insisted that the Confederacy continue, while Lincoln insisted it would not.

Lincoln and Davis- The impossible Divide:

Lincoln despaired over the continuing loss of life in the war, but expected that Jefferson Davis would not agree to unconditional surrender as long as he had viable military forces in the field. In his annual message to Congress a month earlier, Lincoln said, “No attempt at negotiation with the insurgent leader could result in any good” because Davis "would accept nothing short of severance of the Union—precisely what we will not give. His declarations are explicit and oft-repeated. He cannot voluntarily reaccept the Union; we cannot voluntarily yield it. Therefore, the issue between him and us ... can only be tried by war and decided by victory.”

Lincoln also knew that if his administration made any direct contact with the Confederate President (who Lincoln referred to as the insurgent or rebel leader) it might suggest to some that the Union recognized the legitimacy of the Confederate government and the secessionist state governments. Lincoln would not allow that! On the other hand, Lincoln said he would receive overtures from representatives of any state which sought to withdraw secession declarations and requested return to the United States. He said, “They can, at any moment, have peace simply by laying down their arms and submitting to the national authority under the Constitution. But he concluded with this clear statement, “The abandonment of armed resistance to the national authority is the only indispensable condition to ending the war" Then to make his point to those southerners who hoped slavery might be permitted in some regions, Lincoln said that he “would not retract or modify the Emancipation Proclamation, nor return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that Proclamation.” He finished his remarks on the subject by saying, “The war will cease on the part of the government, whenever it shall have ceased on the part of those who began it."

The Architect of the Conference

Then, on December 28, 1864, shortly after Lincoln’s electoral victory for a second term, Francis Preston Blair, Sr., asked to see the President. Blair, a Southerner from Maryland, was a long-time political leader with influence among both Republicans and Democrats.  He was an early opponent of secession and then had supported the war effort to preserve the Union. Lincoln respected Blair and had even named his son to a cabinet position. Blair, by then over seventy years old, offered to go to the Confederate Capital of Richmond, Virginia to meet personally with Jefferson Davis, who he had known for many years. Lincoln granted Blair a pass across Union lines to visit Richmond, with a cover story that Blair hoped to retrieve some personal papers seized by Confederate forces who had raided and burned his Maryland home; an incident for which Davis had expressed regret. Lincoln was careful to impress on Blair that he should not provide a “peace” overture to Blair. Today we might call it “plausible deniability” in the event Blair’s trip became public and was perceived as political blunder.

Davis saw an opportunity in meeting with Blair. There were growing concerns among Confederate officials that Davis was opposed to any peace discussions and some were beginning to question his authority to direct the war. Perhaps Davis believed that, if President Lincoln continued to push for the subjugation of the Confederacy and capitulation by the South, Davis could use Lincoln’s intransigence to re-ignite Southern support for the war effort.

On January 12, 1865, Blair arrived in Richmond, having passed through battle lines under a flag of truce; and went directly to the Executive Mansion of the Confederate States of America and its President, Jefferson Davis.

The Mexico Plan

What Blair suggested to Davis was astounding! And, unknown to Lincoln. His plan called for the cessation of hostilities between the North and the South and the uniting of forces to oppose French expansion into Mexico. Blair declared that slavery should no longer remain an insurmountable obstruction to pacification because all sides could now agree that it would soon die out anyway. Blair said that he believed Lincoln might be open to reconciliation, and a permanent peace, if a cease-fire could be arranged. That would be followed by a combined Union and Confederate force which would drive the French out of Mexico; and then, restoration of the Union could occur. Perhaps just being polite to his friend, Davis listened, but, then quickly rejected the proposal saying that the Mexicans themselves must solve their own problem.

Davis wrote a note stating that he was willing to appoint a delegation to meet with President Lincoln or his representatives for the purpose of ending the war, “with a view to secure peace to the two countries." Whether Blair was so pleased to obtain any remarks from Jefferson Davis which hinted at a prospect for peace, or if he missed (or ignored) the significance of Davis’s concluding words of “two countries,” he was returning with a message Lincoln would never accept.

But Blair would bring other favorable news to Lincoln. He had met with friends in Richmond who told him that they believed their cause was lost and Davis was just hanging on.

The Conference takes shape

Blair met with Lincoln on January 18 and delivered Davis’s note. Lincoln also summarily dismissed Blair’s idea of a joint military action in Mexico but was grateful for the information about discontent among other Southern leaders; who he hoped might be able to pressure Davis into surrender. Lincoln was somewhat encouraged by Davis’s apparent willingness to negotiate but again, clearly stated that he would not accept any recognition of the Confederacy as a legitimate government (the “two-state” solution). The President asked Blair to return to Richmond, this time carrying a letter, addressed to Blair, but to be shared with Jefferson Davis. Lincoln wrote, “I have constantly been ready to receive any agent whom he, or any other influential person now resisting the national authority, may informally send to me with a view to securing peace to the people of our one common country." Lincoln had made clear in his note to Blair (and secondarily to Davis) that he would not agree to any negotiations based on Davis's "two-countries" condition.

Of course, word leaked out about Blair’s mission, but not the details of the conversations, so speculations, and even outright falsehoods, appeared in newspapers and in the halls of Congress in both the North and the South. The New York Herald reported that the city "has been under an intense excitement during the last few days over the question of peace. All manner of probable and improbable, possible and impossible stories have been in circulation.”

But Lincoln’s most serious critics were angered by reports of his overture to Davis; many in his own party. Radical Republicans, who wanted the Confederacy crushed, followed by penalizing reconstruction requirements and retribution against secessionist leaders, assumed that Lincoln planned to negotiate a compromise peace with the rebels. The New York Times, which often disagreed with the President, wrote,“None but national authorities can wage war or make for peace; and the moment we enter into negotiations with the rebel Government for terms of peace, that moment we have…. conceded everything for which they have been making war. Federal officials should continue to deal solely with the rebels as individuals, not their pretended government in Richmond.”

Edwin Stanton, the Secretary of War, expressed concern that rumors of peace initiatives would reduce the already dwindling numbers of new recruits and might even weaken the resolve of the soldiers who were still fighting the war.  But Lincoln was willing to take that risk.

Blair returned to Richmond and again met with Davis on January 21. After Davis had read the letter, he quickly realized that Lincoln’s comment “our one common country”' was directly related to his own words in his letter which referred to “the two countries.” Blair told Davis that Lincoln could not compromise on the one-country principle as a condition for peace talks, but, Davis seemed willing to pursue the opportunity. He met with Confederate Vice President Alexander H. Stephens and described his meetings with Blair. Stephens, who was acquainted with Lincoln through their earlier service in the U.S. Congress, believed there was still some chance of a cease-fire without giving up Confederate sovereignty or accepting re-union. Davis agreed, and, unusual for him at the time, obtained approval from his cabinet.

However, Davis was concerned that, even with any safe-passage granted by Lincoln, he might be detained and arrested; so, he selected a high-ranking team of Confederate officials to attend. He chose Stephens, Robert M. Hunter, a former U.S. Senator and Confederate Secretary of State, and John A. Campbell, a former Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, to meet with Lincoln or his representatives. Davis made clear that his primary purpose was a cease-fire.

The Preliminary Arrangements

Lincoln was cautious. He decided to send Secretary of State Seward closer to City Point, where General Ulysses S. Grant had headquarters, to await a determination as to where Seward (and possibly Lincoln) might meet the Confederate Commissioners. While the Southern emissaries hoped they would travel to Washington DC to meet the President; Lincoln believed that would add some legitimacy to the Confederacy and he was not going to let that happen.

In the meanwhile, The U.S. House of Representatives was debating the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, and rumors of a “Peace Conference” prompted opponents to demand that President Lincoln answer whether Peace Commissioners were in the city.” In a carefully worded reply Lincoln wrote the Speaker of the House that, “There are no peace commissioners in the City nor are there likely to be any in it.”  This most honest man had just deliberately mis-led Congress.

Lincoln was still hesitant to engage in high-level discussions until he knew more about the Confederate Commissioners expectations. As an interim step, Lincoln decided to have General Grant, who was already near the battle-lines, and Major Thomas Eckert, who was in charge of the War Department’s telegraph office, to first meet with the Commissioners. After their reports, Lincoln would decide if there would be a conference and where it would be held.

Major Eckert and General Grant met with the Commissioners and informed them that any proposal, which included a cease-fire, must also be tied to reconstruction and re-union into one country. Eckert and Grant did not coordinate their individual reports to the President and their impressions could not have been more different. Eckert said later that his assignment came directly from the President and he felt compelled to report independently of General Grant. 

Eckert informed Lincoln that the Conference should not occur as the Commissioners insisted that the “two countries” begin negotiations on only a cease-fire. Lincoln was described as disappointed by Eckert’s report, but not surprised. This could have been a fatal blow to the proposed conference.

However, General Grant still had some hope that a conference could be valuable and sent a message on the evening of February 1st which read, “I am convinced, upon conversation with Messrs. Stephens & Hunter that their intentions are good and their desire sincere to restore peace and union….I fear now their going back without any expression from any one in authority will have a bad influence."

Lincoln trusted Grant and telegraphed the General to permit the Commissioners to travel further north to Hampton Roads (in Union territory) and wait on board the “River Queen” a large river boat with accommodations for the three men. Then surprising everyone, Lincoln decided to leave Washington DC and join Seward for the meeting. Grant’s message may have led Lincoln to agree that he should at least meet with the commissioners to avoid “a bad influence” on any future peace initiatives.

Word of Lincoln’s departure and realization that he might meet with a Confederate Peace Commission surprised both Republicans and Democrats in Washington and most were critical! Not all prominent politicians, however, were opposed to the meeting. Offering a left-handed compliment, the grandson of President John Quincy Adams wrote to his father; “It is a step forward, an indispensable first step. As for dignity, I do not look to President Lincoln for that. However, I do look to him for honesty and shrewdness and I see no evidence that in this matter he has been wanting in these respects."

(NOTE: The next article, Part 2, covers the extraordinary meeting among President Lincoln, Secretary of State William Seward, and three Confederate officials; known in history as The Hampton Roads Peace Conference)

The Meeting:

To Preston Blair’s surprise, Lincoln agreed to meet with three Southern delegates designated by Jefferson Davis, and led by Confederate Vice President, Alexander Stephens, along with John Campbell and David Hunter, both other senior members of Davis’s administration. There would be a Peace Conference after all, at Hampton Roads, Virginia.

The Peace Conference Begins

Lincoln arrived at Hampton Roads late on the evening of February 2, 1865, after Secretary of State William Seward had already met informally with the commissioners. The next morning, Lincoln, Seward, and the commissioners met on the River Queen, a large river boat docked at Hampton Roads. Lincoln and Stephens knew each other from an earlier time when both men represented their states in Washington DC, so, the opening introductions and conversations were personal and relaxed. The parties agreed that no written record of the discussions would be made and no others would participate.

Then, they got down to business. Most of what we know, or think we know, about the discussions among these five men, is taken from reports Seward and John Campbell wrote for their respective administrations; as well as letters the attendees wrote soon after the meeting and memoirs written years later. Of course, there are discrepancies among these sources, but historians have been able to piece together a probable re-construction of the discussions; and, the following is a brief summary.

Alexander Stephens began by asking a simple question, "Is there no way of putting an end to the present trouble?" Lincoln replied that it was possible but only if those resisting the Union ceased their resistance.

Stephens raised Davis’s desire for a cease-fire but Lincoln replied that the Union would not suspend military operations until the national authority was reestablished throughout the South.

Campbell asked for Lincoln’s views on Reconstruction. Lincoln’s answer was that reunion could be achieved simply by the Southern states disbanding their armies and permitting federal authorities to resume their functions. The Commissioners stated that here were numerous logistical, administrative and legal question which remained. For examples, (a) the disbandment of the scattered Confederate armies and war materials, (b) private property settlements, (c) the dismantling of Martial Law provisions, (d) legal status of emancipated slaves and slaves in areas not covered by the Emancipation Proclamation, and (e) the social upheaval that could result from universal and immediate emancipation of several million slaves. Seward said that the Federal government would be “liberal in making restitution of confiscated property, or providing indemnity, after the excitement of the times had passed."

Lincoln addressed the elephant in the room; slavery. He admitted that opinions differed on the legality of the Emancipation Proclamation, which was not a law, but only a Presidential war measure. Lincoln said that, after peace was reached, the courts should decide those matters. Seward then presented a copy of the Thirteenth Amendment, which had passed both Houses of Congress and was on the way to be ratified by three-fourths of the states. Although the Commissioners were aware of the Congressional intent, they had not yet seen the final version.

Lincoln said that he had always opposed the extension of slavery into the territories, believed slavery could not be morally justified, felt that his Emancipation Proclamation was a reasonable war-time measure, and supported the Thirteenth Amendment.  Stephens later wrote that Lincoln added, "Whatever may have been the views of your people before the war, they must be convinced now, that Slavery is doomed. It cannot last long in any event, and the best course, it seems to me, for your public men to pursue, would be to adopt such a policy as will avoid, as far as possible, the evils of immediate emancipation."

Recollections of the other attendees differ with most of quote by Stephens, and they agree only that Lincoln stated, “Slavery is doomed.” Historians believe it is unlikely that Lincoln suggested a protracted ratification; as he had hoped the Amendment would be ratified quickly.

Then, the President suggested his support for federal compensation to slaveholders if a Southern state unilaterally abolished slavery. Lincoln, putting on his diplomatic hat, said, “If it was wrong in the South to hold slaves, it was wrong in the North to carry on the slave trade and sell them to the South, ... and to have held on to the money.” Lincoln was careful to remind the Commissioners that he would need Congressional approval for any compensation plan, but, that he would support it.

The five men then discussed the issues that would arise from universal and immediate emancipation of all slaves, who had no structured means to provide for themselves. Lincoln, by most accounts, agreed there would be disruptions within society, but that was preferable to continued slavery. Lincoln realized that newly freed slaves would not be able to work their way up the American social ladder without some assistance. To his point, within weeks, he supported the Freedman’s Bureau Bill, which provided for funds to help newly freed and dislocated slaves.

After almost four hours of talks on board the River Queen, Commissioner Hunter offered his summary of the Conference. He said that the talks left nothing for the South but "unconditional submission” to the North; but Seward promptly replied that the words “unconditional submission” had not been used by either Lincoln or him. Seward continued, "Yielding to the execution of the laws under the Constitution of the United States, with all its guarantees and securities for personal and political rights, was not unconditional submission to conquerors." To further ease the Commissioners’ concerns Lincoln said that he had the sole power to pardon, and restore property, and he would liberally exercise that authority.

Despite these critical opposing views, there were some agreements reached. Lincoln was willing to resume prisoner exchanges and said he would so advise General Grant. Then, as a personal gesture, Lincoln agreed to pardon Alexander Stephens’ nephew who was held as a prisoner of war.

The Aftermath

Although, as he had expected, the Commissioners, certainly under direction from Jefferson Davis, had rejected his terms for peace, Lincoln hoped that individual secessionist states would realize the futility of continuing to fight, would withdraw their support (and their troops) from the Confederate armies, and approach the administration for reconciliation. Lincoln believed one key initiative could accelerate those prospects; compensation to the former slave-owners. He proposed to his Cabinet that Congress authorize a fund of $400,000,000 for compensation which the administration could pay proportionally to each slaveholding state, including the four border states which had never seceded, based on their slave populations in 1860. The Cabinet members, without exception, opposed the idea and they all agreed Congress would never approve the funds. As a result, Lincoln never made that specific proposal public.

Congressional leaders wanted assurances from Lincoln that, during the conference, he had not made any concessions to the Confederacy which would not meet Congressional approval. Lincoln agreed to present a summary and on February 10th, he delivered his message to Congress. In an extraordinary gesture, he provided copies of the documents in his possession related to the Conference, and added a brief commentary to explain the purpose of each communication. Then he concluded with these remarks; "…nothing was said inconsistently therewith; while, by the other party it was not said that they ever would consent to re-union, and yet they equally omitted to declare that they would so consent. They seemed to desire a postponement of that question, and the adoption of some other course first (a cease-fire) which might or might not, lead to reunion.” Lincoln said he could not agree, so the Conference ended without result. The Congressional reaction was overwhelmingly favorable. Lincoln had won over many of his most vocal critics, at least for his handling of the Conference.

One reporter observed, “The president gave enough information in the report to show the subtle wisdom with which his mission had been conducted and concluded. When the reading was completed, an instant and irrepressible storm of applause erupted begun by the members on the floor, and taken up by the people in the gallery.... The Speaker only perfunctorily attempted to quell it."

Even Thaddeus Stevens, one of Lincoln’s most severe critics and a proponent of harsh measures against members of the Confederacy, said, “I do not believe there was a man on this side who desired to sue for peace, so close was the Union to victory in the war. But the President thought it was best to make the effort, and he has done it in such a masterly style, upon such a firm basis and principle, that I believe those of us who thought his mission there was unwise, will accord to him sagacity and patriotism, and applaud his action."

Of course, there were a few Democrats, sympathetic to the South, who criticized the President for not considering the interim cease-fire proposal made by the Commissioners.

And the New York Times which had expressed doubt about Blair’s mission, headlined simply, “We escaped the meddlesome antics of Blair due to the good sense of President Lincoln!”

The Times continued that Lincoln had “…swept away the doubts of many Northerners that the rebels were fighting for independence” instead, the Times further noted, “The rebels were primarily fighting to maintain slavery. Hampton Roads should now unite all (Union) men, without distinction of party, in a cordial support of the Government and a vigorous prosecution of the war."

The New York Herald, wrote that Lincoln was "…one of the shrewdest diplomats of the day. At the same time Lincoln's liberality regarding the restoration of Constitutional rights in the South, combined with his firm commitment to reunion will operate to widen the distractions, dissensions, demoralizations and confusion existing throughout the rebellious States. The next rebel military disaster will inevitably precipitate a Southern popular revolution in behalf of peace and of submission to the Union."

As expected, the reactions from political leaders and newspapers in the South were, at first, universally angry. President Davis denounced Lincoln's rejection of an interim cease-fire and one editorial declared, “The black republican president demands an unconditional submission to the laws and authority of the United States—the sort of submission which the slave yields to the master.” (An interesting analogy from a slave-holder.) In fact, as some in the north had worried, there seemed to be a brief time wherein the rhetoric of Davis, and others who spoke against Lincoln’s stance, may have lifted the defiant spirit of some citizens and soldiers. But not for long!

It soon became evident that most of the Southern public were tired of the war, which their leaders had promised would be quick and would lead to a glorious victory. Instead, Lincoln’s terms were so clear, and the Union military advantage so strong, that even distortions of his message by Davis and die-hard Confederate politicians and newspapers could not stem the tidal wave of despair among their citizens and their soldiers in the field. Divisions within the South were reaching a breaking point by the end of February.

And Lincoln’s second inauguration was only days away.

So, by almost any measure, the Hampton Roads Conference was successful for President Lincoln and the Union. The Southern populous, their Generals, and the politicians, now knew the exact terms to end the war; which was that they must lay down their arms, submit to United States jurisdiction, and accept the demise of the Confederacy. They also knew that full emancipation was a reality that they had to face and that slavery was, in fact, as Lincoln said, “Doomed.”

If, as some historians claim, the only test of whether the Hampton Roads Conference was successful, would have been a signed peace treaty to end hostilities; then they can state that it was a failure or a meaningless gesture. 

However, in so many ways, they would be wrong!