To Divide or Preserve- The Election of 1864 ( Article 20)

In the summer of 1864, Abraham Lincoln was worried. Very worried!

He had come to grips with the probability that, although he had just won his party’s nomination for a second term as President, he could lose the election in November. To his friends, family, and Cabinet members he seemed to accept that possibility without bitterness, as he told them that the failure of Union forces to militarily overcome the Confederacy gave “the people sufficient cause to scuttle this administration.” He knew that he could personally handle the defeat and expected that he would just return home to Springfield to be among his friends and to resume his law practice with William Herndon.

His worry, therefore, was not for himself, but for the Country. Lincoln had freely acknowledged that there were men who could probably be a more effective Commander-in-Chief and provide the military leadership needed to hasten a victory over the Confederacy.  He was, however, near despair that a new President might be elected who would try to settle the War with a peace agreement which left the Nation divided, slavery intact, and a horrific Civil War fought in vain.

Then the Democratic Party nominated as President the one person Abraham Lincoln was certain would not continue the fight to preserve the United States or to abolish slavery; former General George B. McClellan!

In 1862, Lincoln had removed McClellan from duty for his reluctance to engage Confederate forces saying, “he has the slows” after the General had openly defied a series of strategic directives. In one of the ironies of history, McClellan’s nomination in 1864 came at the same “Wigwam” building in Chicago where Lincoln had been nominated in 1860.

One Republican Senator said, “If Lincoln loses the election to McClellan, the United States will fail.”  However, he was not referring to a military victory by the South, but instead to the expectation that McClellan would offer a peace settlement that left the Confederate States of America as a distinct, and separate, government within which slavery would be perpetuated.

Lincoln said, “I fear he will give Jefferson Davis more than he has won.”

McClellan had campaigned on a “Peace for All” platform and promised that, if elected, he would initiate an offer to the Confederate States which could end the War without interference with “property rights;” which was the common euphemism for slavery. Further, he stated that Lincoln’s 1863 Presidential Emancipation Proclamation was “illegal and detrimental to peaceful settlement” implying that he would rescind the edict. Lincoln feared that repeal of the Proclamation might result in widespread slave insurrections and had earlier said, “The whole slave population of the South expects its freedom at our hands. These Black millions are waiting patiently for their time to come, and if this War ends without giving them their freedom, they will take it.”

Buoyed by the possibility of a McClellan victory, Confederate President Jefferson Davis, who despised Lincoln, weighed in and said that his government would favorably respond to peace overtures by “President” McClellan.

By mid-1864, the Northern population was growing “war weary” and some would have preferred the permanent separation of the Southern states as a viable alternative to the continuing death and destruction of the Civil War. These northern citizens were not swayed by assurances from Lincoln, other Union politicians, and military leaders that the Federal armies would eventually prevail over the Confederate forces.

But would a majority of the nation’s voters be willing to wait for that outcome?

Lincoln was painfully aware that the voter combination of wavering Republicans and “Peace Democrats” could turn the White House over to McClellan. And Lincoln feared the possible election of McClellan because the Founding Fathers’ concept of a United nation comprised of the several States could be forever lost.

Upon McClellan’s nomination in August, Lincoln presented his Cabinet with a sealed envelope which he asked them to sign and date without permitting them to read the contents; only alluding to a personal promise to be revealed later. He told his secretaries that he did not want to be talked out of the pledge that the envelope contained. Lincoln’s confidential memo stated, “It seems exceedingly likely that this administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the President Elect, as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration; as he will have secured the election on such ground that he can not possibly save it afterward.”

To a casual observer, Lincoln simply gave a noble promise to work with an incoming President, but historians agree this was no benign pledge.

Actually, if he lost, Lincoln intended to throw overwhelming Union resources of men and armament into furious charges in an attempt to drive Confederate forces to surrender and capitulation in the four months between the election and McClellan’s inauguration on March 4, 1864. And, in fact, Lincoln and Grant immediately began to employ some elements of that military strategy beginning in August.

However, even if these relentless attacks did not drive the Confederate government to a final unconditional surrender by March 4, the Southern forces would be so weakened that McClellan, as the new President, would be left with an incredibly strong bargaining position. In that event, it would be nearly impossible for McClellan to fail to seize a forceful pro-Union advantage in any peace negotiations or he would risk being judged by Congress and most northern citizens as an appeaser; which Lincoln suspected he might be.

Lincoln intended to build a box within which McClellan would be cornered with no choice but to extract major concessions from the South.

In any case, in August 1864, Lincoln accepted the probability that he would lose the November election. On the other hand, George McClellan was absolutely confident that he would win.

But, no one has ever been able to accurately predict the fortunes or pace of war and, within weeks of Lincoln’s confidential pledge, the Union victories began to pile up. Admiral Farragut won control of the ports in Mobile, Alabama. General Sherman captured Atlanta. General Sheridan gained control of the Shenandoah Valley. And General Grant was pushing General Lee further into Virginia.

The end of the long Civil War was not yet imminent, but it was clearly perceivable; and the mood of the northern electorate began to improve.

On Election Day, November 8, 1864, McClellan, ever a pompous and arrogant person by nature who considered himself superior to Lincoln in every way, expected victory.

In contrast, Abraham Lincoln prepared his family, friends and his Cabinet for loss and then went to the War Department telegraph office to wait for the results.

Neither Lincoln nor McClellan could have been more surprised at the outcome. Lincoln won the popular vote 2,200,000 to 1,500,000 and the electoral vote 212 to 21. This was a devastating defeat for McClellan and an endorsement for Lincoln; and sent a clear message to Jefferson Davis that there would be no forthcoming peace initiative favorable to the Confederate States.

Lincoln took special pride in the results of the military canvass as he won nearly 80% of the vote of soldiers who, after all, carried the heaviest burden of the War.

After the election, when it no longer served any purpose, Lincoln shared the “pledge” with his Cabinet.

We can only ponder what would have been left of the United States of America if McClellan had won the 1864 election and quickly negotiated with the Confederate States. Would McClellan have repealed the Emancipation Proclamation? If so would those slaves already freed by the 1863 Proclamation have been forced to return to their Southern masters? McClellan certainly would not have championed the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution to abolish slavery as Lincoln did in January 1865. Would the slave holding Border States of Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, and Missouri, which had remained in the Union, have retained legalized slavery? Would there have been deadly slave insurrections, especially in several large areas where they substantially outnumbered the White population? Would there have been two independent nations which shared a border along Arkansas, Tennessee, and Virginia? Would, as Lincoln predicted, the Confederate States have later broken up into several smaller nations and become “the worst of Europe” and unable to prevent foreign intervention?

In October 1864, several Republican Senators, concerned about the outcome, asked Lincoln to consider suspension of the November election. Despite facing the real possibility of defeat, he refused and said: “We cannot have free government without free elections; and if the rebellion could force us to forgo or postpone a national election, it might fairly claim to have already conquered us.”

But then, 2,200,000 citizens and 212 electors cast ballots for Abraham Lincoln!

And, I believe, preserved the United States of America.

Contact the author at   gadorris2@gmail.com